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THE OFFICE OF THE OATH 
Patrick 0. Gudridge* 
There is little difficulty, Alexander Bickel declared, in con-
cluding that the Constitution takes precedence in cases in which 
the Constitution and congressional legislation conflict. Whether, 
or in what circumstances, federal judges should assume the re-
sponsibility of deciding if there is such a conflict is a separate and 
ultimately more important matter. Marbury v. Madison there-
fore "begged the question-in-chief"': 
[A] statute's repugnancy to the Constitution is in most in-
stances not self-evident; it is, rather, an issue of policy that 
someone must decide. The problem is who: the courts, the 
legislature itself, the President, perhaps juries for purposes of 
criminal trials, or ultimately and finally the people through 
the electoral process?2 
None of Chief Justice Marshall's arguments persuaded 
Bickel that active involvement of judges in constitutional inter-
pretation is in any sense necessary. It "may be possible; but it is 
optional. "3 The fact that federal judges take oaths to support the 
Constitution, a matter of considerable relevance for Chief Jus-
tice Marshall, was-it seemed-especially beside the point: 
This same oath ... is also required of "Senators and Repre-
sentatives, ... Members of the several State Legislatures, and 
all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States 
and of the several States .... " Far from supporting Marshall, 
the oath is perhaps the strongest textual argument against 
him. For it would seem to obligate each of these officers, in 
the performance of his own function, to support the Constitu-
tion. On one reading, the consequence might be utter chaos-
everyone at every juncture interprets and applies the Consti-
tution for himself. Or ... it may be deduced that everyone is 
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. 
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 3 (1962). 
2. !d. 
3. !d. at 6. 
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to construe the Constitution with finality insofar as it ad-
dresses itself to the performance of his own peculiar function. 
Surely the language lends itself more readily to this interpre-
tation than to Marshall's apparent conclusion, that everyone's 
oath to support the Constitution is qualified by the judiciary's 
oath to do the same, and that every official of government is 
sworn to support the Constitution as the judges, in pursuance 
of the same oath, have construed it, rather than as his own 
conscience may dictate.4 
Professor Bickel proceeded too quickly. John Marshall 
might have readily agreed that judicial constitutional interpreta-
tion is "an issue of policy"- but he may well have thought (I will 
argue) that the presuppositions of the oath to support the Con-
stitution provided that policy. He might have readily endorsed 
the proposition that "everyone at every juncture interprets and 
applies the Constitution for himself"- but he probably would 
not have viewed this state of affairs as "utter chaos." The pre-
suppositions of the oath implied not only authorization for con-
stitutional interpretation but also the requisite discipline. 
Are such conceptions (conceptions Marshall might have 
plausibly held) of any pertinence now? I address this question 
last. It is first necessary to sketch what he might have taken "the 
presuppositions of the oath" to be. 
A 
This is the text of Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of 
oaths in Marbury: 
Why otherwise does it [the Constitution] direct the judges to 
take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies in an 
especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. 
How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as 
the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating 
what they swear to support! 
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is com-
pletely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this sub-
ject. It is in these words: "I do solemnly swear that I will ad-
minister justice without respect to persons, and do equal right 
to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and im-
partially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as 
___ , according to the best of my abilities and under-
4. !d. at 8. 
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standing agreeably to the constitution and laws of the United 
States." 
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to 
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution 
forms no rule for his government? If it is closed upon him, 
and cannot be inspected by him? 
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn 
mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a 
crime.5 
389 
The constitutional oath to which Marshall refers is, of course, the 
oath required by Article VI, section 3: 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the 
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive 
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the 
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to sup-
port this Constitution: but no religious Test shall ever be re-
quired as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under 
the United States.6 
Why make much of this oath? Oaths of allegiance had 
played a prominent part in English constitutional practice since 
at least the reign of Hemy VIII. But their use was, more often 
than not, linked with reformations of relationships of church and 
state. Administration of oaths, usually selective, was a way of 
testing for anti-establishment dissent, thus inhibiting it, or adver-
tising the (seemingly) small number of dissenters in a particular 
place at a particular time.7 The article VI oath, by its terms, bars 
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). 
6. The presidential oath, set out in article II, section 1, paragraph 8, of the Consti-
tution is worded not much differently: "Before [the President) enter on the Execution of 
his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: -'I do solemnly swear (or af-
firm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to 
the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States."' Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment attaches implications to the article VI 
oath: 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President 
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or 
under any State, who having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as 
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or an executive 
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall 
have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to 
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
7. See DAVID MARTIN JONES, CONSCIENCE AND ALLEGIANCE IN SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY ENGLAND: THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF OATHS AND ENGAGEMENTS 
14-62 (1999). English practice, in this regard, put loyalty oaths to work in much the same 
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this sort of managerial deployment- "but no religious Test shall 
ever be required .... "8 This oath, moreover, is an obligation im-
posed only on federal and state officials. The most important 
English oaths purported to test the general population, or at 
least parts of it; the oaths frequently put to use in America dur-
ing the Revolution also served as a means for scrutinizing the al-
legiance of suspect members of the public at large.9 The article 
VI oath also requires only a terse pledge "to support this Consti-
tution." The oath itself thus identifies no "central tenets" of con-
stitutional faith10; it would seem, at least at first reading, pre-
cisely to invite the sort of jesuitical casuistry that had put in 
question the usefulness of the English reformation oaths.11 
The article VI oath, in first draft, imposed its obligation only 
on state officials. 12 It provoked a suggested amendment aimed at 
obliging federal officials to respect state constitutions. Such an 
added duty, we might well think, would have substantially com-
plicated the workings of the Supremacy Clause. 13 The final ver-
sion of the article VI oath did not create this risk; it requires only 
a promise "to support this [federal] Constitution." Its extension 
to encompass federal officials also, if it was meant to mollify 
state officials, would seem to have done so by adopting a princi-
ple of equal suspicion, in effect declaring "We trust no govern-
ment officials 'to support this Constitution.'" Why, though, was 
the oath left so empty? The drafters could not have thought, 
could they, that the Constitution was entirely unambiguous? 
way that Augustus did, in the Roman constitutional crisis of 32, invoking the famous all-
Italy oath of that year as proof of his authority. See RONALD SYME, THE ROMAN 
REVOLUTION 284-89 (1939). 
8. "The 'but' suggests that the Framers considered the constitutional oath a substi-
tute for the religious tests the colonists were familiar with under the English established 
church." Thomas C. Grey, The ConstituJion as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1984) 
(emphasis deleted). 
9. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
214-15 (1991). 
10. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 94 (1988); see id. 122-25 (dis-
cussing Marbury and the emptiness of the constitutional oath). 
11. See MARTIN JONES, supra note 7, at 88-98. See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, 
LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 67-68 (1993). 
12. For pertinent legislative history, see 4 PHILLIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, 
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 637-38 (1987). 
13. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 287 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)(explaining difference in treatment on the ground that federal officials do not par-
ticipate in state government, but state officials are involved in federal government). 
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B 
It is clear, at least, that John Marshall wrote as though there 
was a point to the oath, as though it proved something, passage 
of some sort of "Test," a matter (whatever it was) of importance 
for judges. 
The high pitch of his language in Marbury is striking. He 
uses three rhetorical questions and an exclamation in the course 
of seven sentences (excluding the expository paragraph quoting 
the legislatively-imposed oath). Terms like "immoral," "solemn 
mockery," and "crime" jump from the page. All of this empha-
sis, it appears, serves to underscore the proposition, put immedi-
ately previously, that "it is apparent, that the framers of the con-
stitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the 
government of courts, as well as of the legislature."14 The key 
phrase, obviously, is "rule for the government of courts" -it re-
appears in the penultimate paragraph in the sequence; if the 
Constitution "forms no rule for ... government" for "a judge" 
than the oath "becomes ... a crime," "is worse than solemn 
mockery." 
What does "rule for ... government" mean? Marshall equates 
"court" and "judge." It is as individuals that judges are governedY 
An earlier sentence makes this conclusion obvious: "This oath 
certainly applies in an especial manner, to their conduct in their 
official character" (by implication, applies to unofficial conduct as 
well-and thus governs judges as individuals). How is it possible 
for individuals to violate the Constitution-and thus to oblige 
themselves to refrain from violating the Constitution- when act-
ing unofficially? Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment supplies 
one later answer. Insurrection or rebellion are plainly not official 
acts; but they are, it seems, violations of the oath to support the 
Constitution. Insurrection or rebellion also likely constitute trea-
son, of course. "Treason against the United States, shall consist 
only in levying War against them, or, in adhering to their Ene-
mies, giving them Aid and Comfort." Article III, section 3, is 
broader, is not limited in application only to public officials, to 
oath-takers. Still, for federal or state official in particular, 
14. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 179-80. 
15. On the conception of judges as "legal savants," largely consistent with the ar-
gument that I develop in this essay, but broader in its implications, see G. Edward White, 
Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 781, 783-98 
(2000). 
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though, we might take treason to be an (the?) obvious example 
of failure to support the Constitution. 
Supposing insurrection or rebellion or treason in general to 
be examples of breaches of the constitutional oath-does this 
mean that other such failures are of more or less equal moment? 
This would not have to be the case, of course. But something 
akin to this equation seems to play a part in Chief Justice Mar-
shall's formulations. Or at least, if this is so, we can begin to ap-
preciate the outrage that he proclaims: If "courts must close 
their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law," they run the 
risk of acting contrary to the Constitution-violating the Consti-
tution. If judges are "to be used as the instruments, and the 
knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to sup-
port" -after all, judges do not really "close their eyes" -they are 
put in a position something like that of rebels or traitors. Why is 
failure to abide by the Constitution, as judges themselves under-
stand the Constitution, akin to treason, insurrection, or rebel-
lion? Why might Marshall write as though this equation was 
given? 
c 
Treason is a topic that the 1787 Constitution repeatedly ad-
dresses, in disconcertingly matter of fact ways. We might under-
stand the article III, section 3, definition as an important limita-
tion, and so too the following sentences requiring proof by two 
witnesses to an overt act or confession in open court and prohib-
iting punishment of the families of traitors.16 But what are we to 
make of article II, section 4? "The President, Vice President and 
all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Of-
fice on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, 
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Or article IV, section 
2, paragraph 2? "A Person charged in any State with Treason, 
Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be 
found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Au-
thority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be 
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." 
"[L]evying War" against the United States, or "adhering to their 
16. No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Wit-
nesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. ['I] The Congress shall 
have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall 
work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. 
U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 3. 
2003] THEOFRCEOFTHEOATH 393 
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort," are acts that the Con-
stitution contemplates that even the highest "civil Officers of the 
United States" might commit, and as against this possibility out-
lines responsive procedures. Treasonous acts vis a vis state gov-
ernments, however state laws define treason, are both foresee-
able and (often) matters of routine; ordinary extradition 
procedures, the Constitution seems to conclude, will frequently 
suffice in dealings with persons charged with state law treason. 17 
Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist No. 74, again ap-
pears to treat treason as ordinary, not surprising, the political 
equivalent of especially bad weather: 
The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the 
President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation 
to the crime of treason .... As treason is a crime leveled at the 
immediate being of the society when the laws have once as-
certained the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in re-
ferring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the 
judgment of the legislature. And this ought the rather to be 
the case, as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief 
Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But there are 
also strong objections to such a plan .... It deserves particular 
attention that treason will often be connected with seditions 
which embrace a large proportion of the community, as lately 
happened in Massachusetts. In every such case we might ex-
pect to see the representation of the people tainted with the 
same spirit which had given birth to the offense .... But the 
principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in 
this case in the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrec-
tion or rebellion, there are often critical moments when a 
well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may re-
store the tranquility of the commonwealth .... The loss of a 
week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. 18 
17. To be sure, the Constitution also recognizes that there may be extraordinary 
circumstances in particular states-article IV, section 4, assures state governments that 
"[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them ... on Application of the Legislature, or of 
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." 
How extraordinary were these circumstances imagined to be, however, if they were 
thought to require constitutional treatment? Plainly, conceivable cases included serious 
breakdowns in civil order. Why otherwise provide for situations in which "the Legisla-
ture cannot be convened"? 
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 at 448, 449 (Alexander Hamilton)(Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). Hamilton's argument responds to a criticism put by George Mason in 1787: 
"The President of the United States has the unrestrained power of granting pardons for 
treason; which may be sometimes exercised to screen from punishment those whom he 
had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own 
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In Federalist No. 43, James Madison supposes that the problem 
to be addressed is not treason per se, but accusations of trea-
son-like Hamilton, however, he treats the matter as inherent in 
the dynamic of politics as usual: 
As treason may be committed against the United States, the 
authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish 
it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the 
great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring 
of free government, have usually wreaked their alternate ma-
lignity on each other, the convention have, with great judg-
ment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a 
constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof neces-
sary for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in 
punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond 
the person of its author. 19 
D 
Aaron Burr's expedition, we may think, would have con-
firmed the expectations of Hamilton, if Burr-only recently Vice 
President-had not already shot him. Thomas Jefferson's seem-
ingly frantic responses, we might as readily conclude, would have 
struck Madison as clearly illustrating his point, were Madison 
able to think uninfluenced by his own participation in the Jeffer-
son government. The uncertainties as to just what it was that 
Burr and company had actually done, along with further uncer-
tainties as to their purpose (conquer Mexico? seize New Or-
leans?) provided grounds for Chief Justice Marshall, writing for 
the Supreme Court, to dismiss treason charges against two of 
Burr's associates in Ex parte Bollman.10 But Marshall also de-
clared: 
It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can 
be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against 
his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, 
if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of ef-
fecting by force a treasonable purpose; all those who perform 
any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene 
of action, and who are actually leagued in the general con-
spiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an 
guilt." George Mason, "Objections to the Constitution" (1787), reprinted in 1 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 345, 348 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 at 273 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
20. 8 u.s. 75 (1807}. 
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actual assembling of men for the treasonable purpose, to con-
. I . f 21 stitute a evymg o war. 
Jefferson's prosecutors used this passage as a template for an-
other try, aimed at Burr himself. A group of men had made their 
way as far as Virginia, with some measure of direction, encour-
agement, and other assistance from Burr. Under Bollman, 
prosecutors argued, Burr was a traitor, even though he did not 
join up with men ("all those who perform any part, however, ... 
remote"), and even though the group did not assemble in any 
openly military way (at bottom, the government asserted, the 
cohort-including Burr himself-had "the purpose of effecting 
by force a treasonable purpose," and that was enough). Because 
the group gathered in Virginia, venue lay there, and thus the 
presiding judge at trial became Circuit Justice John Marshall. 
Marshall's famous opinion addressed to the jury in the Burr 
case, pointing towards acquittal as to treason, is a notably odd 
performance. It depicts Marshall, at least as much as Burr, as 
standing accused-indeed, it is rather more a defense of Mar-
shall himself than an analysis of Burr's circumstances. The prob-
lem was Bollman. Marshall manuvered at length. He argued that 
the pertinent passage in the opinion was a digression, albeit ex-
cusable dictum, that only four of the seven Justices participated 
in deciding the case, and that one of the four may not have con-
curred in the dictum-all reasons, Marshall sug§ested, not to 
give much weight to the Bollman pronouncement. 2 He nonethe-
less conceded: "If the supreme court have indeed extended the 
doctrine of treason, ... their decision would be submitted to. At 
least this court could no further than to endeavor again to bring 
the point directly before them.'m In any case, prosecutors were 
misreading Bollman. Their construction, Marshall demonstrated 
in detail, put the Supreme Court at odds not only with American 
judges, but also a long line of English authorities, all of whom 
seemed to agree that "levying war"- necessary for treason-
supposed "a warlike assemblage, carrying the appearance of 
force, and in a situation to practice hostility."24 If the Supreme 
Court meant to strike out on its own, fashion a "new-fangled" 
treason (in Madison's words), its opinion would have been forth-
right, would have made the fact of its departure clear: "A mere 
21. /d. at 126. 
22. United States v. Burr, Opinion, U.S. Circuit Court (Va.), August 31, 1807, re-
printed in 7 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 78-79 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1993). 
23. /d. 87. 
24. /d. 86; see id. 82-87. 
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implication, ought not to prostrate a principle which seems to 
have been so well established. Had the intention been enter-
tained to make so material a change in this respect, the court 
ought to have expressly declared .... "25 Close reading revealed 
no such declaration.26 Marshall's own prior rulings in the Burr 
case, he noted, were consistent with narrow construction of 
Bollman.27 
In any event, notwithstanding the government's belief, the 
Supreme Court had not sanctioned prosecution of someone like 
Burr himself, who was not on site at the point of assembly, or at 
least close at hand. English law extended more broadly than the 
literal language of the constitutional definition of treason, allow-
ing use of various fictions that Marshall understood the indict-
ment to foreswear.28 Bollman, in this regard, should be read as 
similarly limiting: 
According to the opinion, it is not enough to be leagued in the 
conspiracy, and that war be levied, but it is also necessary to 
perform a part; that part is the act of levying war. This part, it 
is true, may be minute, it may not be the actual appearance in 
arms; and it may be remote from the scene of action, that is 
from the place where the army is assembled, but it must be a 
part. ... This part however minute or remote constitutes the 
overt act on which alone the person who performs it can be 
convicted. [1] The opinion does not declare that the person 
who has performed this remote and minute part may be in-
dicted for a part which was in truth performed by others and 
convicted on their overt acts. 29 
Burr did not join the others in Virginia; their overt act, if it in-
deed amounted to "levying war," was not his, and thus could not 
come within the Virginia-focused indictment.30 
Concluding his charge, Marshall elaborated a remarkable 
apology: 
No man is desirous of placing himself in a disagreeable situa-
tion. No man is desirous of becoming the peculiar subject of 
25. /d. 87. 
26. See id. 88·92. 
27. See id. 93-94. 
28. See id. 103-09. 
29. /d. 109-10. 
30. Marshall recognized the possibility that Burr might have "procured" the Vir-
ginia assembly and that this would have established a sufficient connection. But the act of 
"procuring" required direct proof as in the case of other overt acts, proof lacking in the 
case so far. See id. 110. 
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calumny. No man, might he let the bitter cup pass from him 
without self-reproach, would drain it to the bottom. But if he 
has no choice in the case; if there is no alternative presented 
to him but a dereliction of duty or the opprobrium of those 
who are denominated the world, he merits the contempt as 
well as the indignation of his country who can hesitate which 
to embrace. 
That gentlemen, in a case the utmost interesting, in the zeal 
with which they advocate particular opinions, & under the 
conviction in some measure produced by that zeal, should on 
each side press their arguments too far, should be impatient at 
any deliberation in the court, and should suspect or fear the 
operation of motives to which alone they can ascribe that de-
liberation, is perhaps a frailty incident to human nature; but if 
any conduct on the part of the court could warrant a senti-
ment that they would deviate to one side or the other from 
that line prescribed by duty and by law, that conduct would be 
viewed by the judges themselves with an eye of extreme se-
verity, and would long be recollected with deep and serious 
regret. 
The arguments on both sides have been intently and delib-
erately considered .... The result of the whole is a conviction 
as complete as the mind of the court is capable of receiving on 
I b. 31 a camp ex su 1ect. ... 
397 
A few weeks later, in the midst of another phase of the case, 
Marshall returned to the question of his integrity: 
Reports may very possibly be in circulation that this court in-
stead of obeying has absolutely reversed a decision of the su-
preme court. While such reports would be entirely incorrect 
in point of fact, they would cast an imputation on the court, 
which, I flatter myself, will never be merited. But such reports 
may circulate with great facility, and the labor of reading the 
opinion to which they refer, and which would certainly refute 
them, will be taken only by a few .... I therefore feel myself 
bound to declare that I have given what I believe to be the 
sound and true legal construction of the opinion of the su-
preme court. ... 32 
31. /d. 115. Some of the grammar of this passage ("they would deviate") reflects the 
fact that Marshall did not sit alone-he was assisted by another federal judge. 
32 /d. 146. Marshall invited counsel to declare that the charges against him "should 
be heard unnoticed." /d. 
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He was, all the same, burned in effigy, along with Burr, in Balti-
more.33 
E 
It is hard not to perceive a dissonance in John Marshall's ef-
forts in Burr. His treatment of Bollman and his specification of 
the parameters of treason exhibit a characteristic exuberant vir-
tuosity, a near too-obvious brilliance-he treats his own prior 
pronouncement as both almost irrelevant and, carefully read, 
precisely correct and dispositive; similarly, common law notions 
of treason figure as limited and controlling and as open-ended 
and beside the point. But Marshall also insists on his own good 
faith and faithfulness-he does not, he urges, "deviate ... from 
that line prescribed by duty and by law." Indeed, he verges on 
literally swearing that this is so ("I ... feel myself bound to de-
clare .... ") He appears to have been genuinely disconcerted by 
hostile public reaction. 
Burr, we can see, is very much of a piece with Marbury. 
There too Marshall showed off a whirlwind facility. His long 
opinion seized upon the organization of the argument of Mar-
bury's counsel and reversed it, repeatedly putting Marbury and 
Madison in the posture of plaintiff and defendant in the course 
of demonstrating Marbury's right to the commission, therefore 
showing, even before Marshall addressed the question explicitly, 
that Marbury's action was easily characterized as an original 
proceeding rather than an appeal-notwithstanding counsel's 
own principal argument. Simultaneously, by repeatedly invoking 
and using constitutional provisions to confirm Marbury's right to 
the commission, Marshall also prepared the way for his conclu-
33. In a letter to Richard Peters, dated November 23, 1807, Marshall remained de-
fensive: 
The day after the commitment of Colo. Burr for a misdemeanor I galloped to 
the mountains whence I only returned in time to perform my North Carolina 
circuit which terminates just soon enough to enable me to be here to open the 
court for the antient dominion. Thus you perceive I have sufficient bodily em-
ployment to prevent my mind from perplexing itself about the attention paid 
me in Baltimore & elsewhere. ['I] I wish I could have had as fair an opportunity 
to let the business go off as a jest here as you seem to have had in Pennsylvania: 
but it was most deplorably serious & I could not give the subject a different as-
pect by treating it in any manner which was in my power. I might perhaps have 
made it less serious to myself by obeying the public will instead of the public 
law & throwing a little more of the sombre upon others. 
Id. 165. Concerning the widespread, negative public reaction to the Burr proceedings, see 
GEORGE LEE HASKINGS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN 
MARSHALL, 1801-15, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 289-
91 (1981). 
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sion that the Constitution was just one species of ordinary law 
(albeit hierarchically superior). Paul Kahn puts the point well: 
"The power of the opinion is precisely its ability to draw the 
reader into an appearance of law that it creates. "34 The razzle-
dazzle concludes, though, with Marshall's insistence that, some-
how, it is all bound up with the constitutionally-required oath of 
allegiance, that it is the obligation imposed by the oath-
faithfulness, again- that judicial opinions like his discharge. It is 
the oath, somehow, that motivates and justifies what came be-
fore. 
Professor Kahn also writes: "Reading Marbury we see only 
the rule of law with its claims of indifference to individual politi-
cal actors, of permanence, and of representation of the peo-
ple. "35 This is, we might think, a difficult proposition to defend. 
Reading Marbury, we plainly see John Marshall-or rather, un-
mistakable marks of his personality: his talents and preoccupa-
tions. Marbury, like Burr, advertises its author-demonstrates 
skill, pleads good faith. Marshall makes his own predicament in 
Burr the organizing frame of his discussion, and thus makes the 
sincerity of his analysis a central theme and question. So too 
Marshall in Marbury calls attention to his own effort, through his 
conspicuous lawyerly counterpoint at the outset, and even more 
so through the emotional coloring he adds to the discussion of 
the constitutional oath at the end. In "the literature of public 
documents" (Robert Ferguson's famous phrase36), Marbury, like 
Burr, stands in notable contrast to the Constitution, written in a 
terse, commonplace, anonymous style exhibiting much more 
clearly Paul Kahn's ideal "rule of law."37 
Readers of Joanne Freeman, however, would not be at all 
surprised to glimpse the subjective insistences in Marbury and 
Burr: 
In a government lacking formal precedents and institutional 
routines, reputation was the glue that held the polity together. 
The fragile new republic was a government of character striv-
ing to become a government of rules within its new constitu-
tional framework. In this highly personal political realm, an 
34. PAUL W. KAH!', THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 17 (1997). 
35. /d. "Central to law's rule is a particular organization of the community's 
consciousness of itself as a single, temporally extended phenomenon." /d. 177. 
36. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT, 1750-1820, p. 149 
(1994). 
37. See id. 135-41. 
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attack on a government measure was an attack on a politician, 
and an attack on a politician immediately questioned his 
honor and reputation. As one statesman noted, "It is impossi-
ble to censure measures without condemning men. "38 
Within the world that Professor Freeman recovers, Jefferson, 
Adams, Hamilton, Madison, Burr, Marshall and their contempo-
raries set to work against the backdrop of gossip, the "paper 
war" of leaked letters, newspapers, pamphlets, and broadside 
posters, dueling codes, and "the universal recognition of the lan-
guage of honor."39 Preoccupied with appearances, they sought to 
present themselves as acting in the public interest, and their ad-
versaries as otherwise motivated. The most successful of these 
actors in "the theater of national politics" carefully modulated 
their attacks on each other and hid their responsibility, aware 
that authorship of overstatement undercut the appeal to public 
interest and, at the extreme, triggered the etiquette of dueling 
and its attendent risks. All were "exceedingly paper-minded": 
more or less sensitive to the political implications of choices of 
forms of public communication, aware also of the risks of "no 
theory," of having drawn "no intellectual line in the sand" evi-
dent enough to assure restraint, to deter corruption.40 
Professor Freeman's account of "paper war" emphasizes 
mostly unofficial writings. We can see, I think, much of the same 
dynamic within the literature of public documents. There is a 
similar inventive profusion of forms: declarations, constitutions, 
resolutions, reports-and Supreme Court opinions. There is a 
similar display of greater or lesser skill in making use of the vari-
ous document types: Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Mar-
shall were obviously virtuosi. We should not be surprised to find 
within public documents, at least within the limits of their form, 
evidences of the anxieties characteristic of the political environ-
ment of the period. The judicial opinion, it might be hypothe-
sized, is the least restricted document-type-an outgrowth of 
oral presentations like the jury charge in Burr, still first pre-
sented orally, only subsequently put in print, as much individual 
as collegial.41 The personal element might thus be most evident 
38. JOANNE 8. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW 
REPUBLIC 69 (2001). 
39. Id. 171; see id. 62-104 ("the art of political gossip), 105-58 ("the art of paper 
war"), 159-98 ("dueling as politics"). 
40. Id. 267,211. 
41. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 
1815-35,3-4 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 181-95 (1988). 
2003] THEOFRCEOFTHEOATH 401 
in the "opinion." Finally, we should be entirely unsurprised if ju-
dicial writings juxtaposed legal erudition and political sensitivity. 
Marbury, we all know, is easily read within the terms of this 
conjunction. Readers of Professor Freeman are well positioned 
to treat Burr as Marbury more so. Were the Burr proceedings 
set in motion by Jefferson, master politician of the era, in order 
to damage Marshall, to take revenge for Marshall's depiction of 
Jefferson in Marbury, and not just to (at minimum) further dis-
grace Burr? Marshall certainly seems to have sensed the trap-
be seen to bow to Jefferson or share in Burr's taint, sacrificing 
political reputation carefully achieved, for example, as the hon-
est chronicler of French corruption in the XYZ affair,42 and the 
official biographer of George Washington.43 Within these terms, 
Marshall's organization of his Burr opinion as a defense of him-
self was not simply judicial narcissism, and his subsequent seem-
ing distress in the face of public criticism, we may think, was 
likely sincere. 
And we can now, finally, appreciate the office of the oath. 
We can understand why only public officials, and not the citi-
zenry at large, were obliged to make the constitutional pledge. 
The problem of distrust, the risk of disloyalty, originated in the 
politics of office. The function of the oath, thus, was also consis-
tent with its wording, was at bottom altogether secular. Its obli-
gation was an obligation to account for disagreement, to demon-
strate no disloyalty or dishonor, to answer the charge of "no 
theory." Its obligation was, in other words, an obligation to "ex-
pound,"44 to show that, for example, the judge's conclusions 
were traceable, in a persuasive enough way, to the Constitution 
(or some other pertinent legal instrument), and thus to show that 
for the judge, "the constitution forms ... [a] rule for his govern-
ment." This is why the terms of the oath, unlike (for example) 
the English test oaths, itself includes no particular propositions 
requiring acknowledgement. 
This is also why, contra Alexander Bickel, it was not suffi-
cient, for purposes of constitutional interpretation in a judicial 
opinion, simply to defer to legislative or executive constitutional 
42 See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE 
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, pp. 549-79 (1993). 
43. On the political significance of the Washington biography, written between 
Marbury and Burr, and Jefferson's appreciation of Marshall's public popularity, see 
FREEMAN, supra note 38, at 61-63,231. 
44. Concerning this characteristic Marshallian term, see FERGUSON, supra note 36, 
at 147. 
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interpretation. "Government" here, it would seem, is chiefly a 
psychological phenomenon. The point was to demonstrate loy-
alty or public interest as a state of mind, to show the sincerity of 
the invocation of the Constitution. Immediate, unreflective def-
erence would not serve as such a demonstration. Affirmations as 
well as rejections of congressional action raised questions of ju-
dicial faithfulness. The complexity or originality of an opinion's 
exposition would not necessarily be inconsistent with the claim 
of "government"- at least if the exposition was persuasive 
enough. 
F 
The oath of allegiance to the Constitution, thus, was a ver-
sion of the Athenian dikastic oath.45 Indeed, it is easy to identify 
other predecessors. For example, the political environment that 
Joanne Freeman describes is not very different from the emer-
gent scientific sphere, with its inter-related concerns for "credi-
ble persons and credible knowledge" that Steven Shapin maps in 
seventeenth century England.46 Shapin reports use of a provoca-
tively similar restricted oath. "If a gentleman's word was his 
bond, the servant required double-bonding."47 The purpose 
served by the federal constitutional oath, as I have characterized 
it, was also not unlike the purpose oaths of allegiance sworn by 
nobles served in twelfth century Occitania: "to counteract threats 
of disintegration," "to recreate ... community," "to internal-
ize ... values."48 As a matter of anthropology, generalization is 
not difficult. The oath-high or low-in each instance "trans-
forms at the same time the representation which the person who 
has been invested makes of himself, and the attitudes which he 
believes it is necessary for him to adopt in order to conform to 
this representation. "49 
Of what use to us now is this history and anthropology? 
A government of institutions not individuals, of complexly 
organized groups of officials and employees no longer reducible 
(for most purposes) to a small set of elite personalities-Is there 
45. See S.C. TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 54-62 (1993). 
46. STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH: CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN 
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 238 (1994). 
47. /d. 403. 
48. FREDRIC L. CHEYETTE, ERMENGARD OF NARBONNE AND THE WORLD OF 
THE TROUBADORS 198 (2001). 
49. Pierre Bourdieu, Rites as Acts of Institution, in HONOR AND GRACE IN 
ANTHROPOLOGY 82 (J.G. Peristany & Julian Pitt-Rivers eds., 1992). 
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any point, within our context now, to thinking through constitu-
tional oaths and their implications? There is this, at least: "Paper 
war" persists (if now also digitally and electro-magnetically). 
"The literature of public documents" remains central, remains 
profuse, remains multiple in its forms. The question of "honor" 
may appear to be anachronistic. But there is an institutional 
variant. The language of comity persists. Constitutional law to-
day regularly evidences concern for due regard for state gov-
ernments, for example, or for executive discretion, or for the Su-
preme Court's place. Institutions do not fight duels. But the 
question of the etiquette of confrontation and conflict remains 
alive.50 
As one test of possible relevance, we might consider, the 
currently-prominent question of congressional enforcement of 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the associated 
question of the limits of congressional freedom to interpret sec-
tion 1 of that amendment in ways justifying legislation more pro-
tective of individual rights than Supreme Court case law would 
justify.51 With respect to this Fourteenth Amendment question, I 
think, several obvious propositions follow if we extrapolate from 
the reading of Marbury and the constitutional oath that I have 
outlined here. 
First, the Supreme Court should bring to bear its own un-
derstanding of the Constitution in passing on the validity of acts 
of Congress. 
Second, the fact that Congress independently interprets the 
Constitution is not problematic-simply a corollary of the con-
gressional constitutional oath. Whether or not the congressional 
reading matches the Supreme Court's understanding is, in and of 
itself, irrelevant for purposes of the substance of judicial consti-
tutional review. The operative question is whether legislation is 
inconsistent with the Constitution within the Court's own inde-
pendent reading. 
Third, if legislation burdens individual rights recognized in 
Supreme Court conceptions, the Court should declare such legis-
lation to be invalid. If the constitutional question is one of 
power, judicial deference to legislative fact-finding or remedial 
50. E.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). 
51. See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003); 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Equal Protection by 
Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 
441 (2001) 
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judgment should not depend upon whether Congress shares the 
Supreme Court's understandings, but upon whether the Court's 
own sense of state government interests or risks of conflict with 
constitutionally-protected individual rights indeed warrants re-
stricting legislative discretion. 
Fourth, in cases in which a statute rests on congressional 
constitutional interpretations evidently differing from those held 
by the Supreme Court, the Court cannot enforce its own views 
unreflectively, through invocation of the doctrine of stare decisis, 
but must consider the matter de novo, thus acknowledging the 
congressional interpretive responsibility, giving it consequence, 
without minimizing the Court's own responsibility. This may be 
an especially important corollary, insofar as Court decisions that 
provoke congressional responses are likely to be controversial in 
terms both immediately legal as well as political.52 
Fifth, the Supreme Court should also attribute to Congress a 
complementary recognition of the independence of the Court's 
own responsibility. The Court need not consider constitutional 
questions without regard to stare decisis unless Congress in fact 
has self-evidently legislated on the basis of contrary constitu-
tional understanding. The substance of the law at issue cannot be 
glossed in any terms that do not presuppose the divergent consti-
tutional understanding. 
This regime pretty plainly differs a lot, at least in form, from 
the working rules that the Supreme Court appears to follow cur-
rently. I do not explore the advantages and disadvantages of the 
approach I have outlined here. I also do not hazard a guess as to 
which results in which of the Supreme Court's decisions would 
change if the five propositions above were brought to bear. This 
regime pretty plainly differs a lot, in more than just form, from 
the working rules that the Supreme Court appears to follow cur-
rently. The Court really ought not to invoke Marbury v. Madison 
in defending its own approach. 
52. The result might be a practice very much resembling the "second look" doctrine 
proposed some years ago by Judge Calabresi-only in reverse: Congress would be able to 
ask the Supreme Court to reconsider its rulings. See generally, GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
